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Everyone knows what bottom-up is, and how it is different from top-down. At least one is
tempted to think so, given that both terms are ubiquitously used, but only rarely defined
in the psychology and neuroscience literature. In this review, we highlight the problems
and limitations of our current understanding of bottom-up and top-down processes, and
we propose a reformulation of this distinction in terms of predictive coding.
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INTRODUCTION
A central assumption in predictive-coding theories is that activity
in the nervous system reflects a process of matching internally gen-
erated predictions to external stimulation (Heekeren et al., 2008;
Bar, 2009). Evidence for this assumption has been collected at dif-
ferent levels of neural processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Hosoya
et al., 2005; Muckli et al., 2005; Summerfield et al., 2006; Alink
et al., 2010), which suggests that predictive-coding operates across
a wide range of spatial and temporal scales.
A second important assumption in predictive coding is that
predictions are transferred from hierarchically higher levels of
processing to lower ones, whereas signals traveling in the oppo-
site direction encode prediction errors (Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Serences, 2008; Friston, 2009; Grossberg, 2009). In accordance
with terminology commonly used in research on perception, it
has thus been suggested that predictive signaling reflects top-down
processes, whereas prediction-error signaling constitutes bottom-
up processing (Friston, 2009; Alink et al., 2010; Hesselmann et al.,
2010).
In this review, we argue that predictive coding provides a
powerful conceptual framework that goes beyond the standard
dichotomy of “bottom-up” and “top-down.” We first provide an
overview of previous attempts at defining bottom-up and top-
down processes, and we highlight their problems and limitations.
We then outline how predictive coding offers a unique perspective
for re-defining what is meant by these terms.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we refer to ascending
and descending connections when discussing the anatomy of bio-
logical systems or the architecture of artificial ones (Friston, 2005;
Clark, in press). Functional activity along these two types of con-
nections is referred to as feedforward and feedback, respectively. We
avoid additional terms such as “recurrent” or “reentrant,” because
we believe they can be subsumed under “feedback” in most cases.
A SHORT HISTORY OF BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN
More than 30 years ago, Kinchla and Wolfe (1979) set out to test
whether visual processing is organized bottom-up or top-down.
Following up on earlier work (Reicher, 1969; Navon, 1977), the
authors used compound stimuli, where a global shape is made up
of smaller, local elements. Upper-case letters were used as stim-
uli, and top-down processing was assumed to manifest itself in
shorter response times (RTs) if the global shape, rather than the
local elements, corresponded to a target letter. Bottom-up process-
ing was defined as “the opposite,” i.e., faster responses if the local
stimulus elements, rather than the overall shape, corresponded
to a target letter. Results indicated that whether a global shape
or its constituent elements are processed faster critically depends
on stimulus size. Kinchla and Wolfe (1979) concluded that visual
perception does not proceed strictly bottom-up or top-down, but
“middle-out.” They suggested that the visual system uses the infor-
mation most readily available in the context of, for example, a
particular stimulus size and viewing distance. Based on this infor-
mation, the system would then work its way toward more global
or more local aspects, as required by the task.
More recently, Melloni et al. (2012) examined the generation
of saliency maps in the visual cortex with functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI). The authors refer to bottom-up salience
as the degree of difference between a stimulus and its neighbors.
In their visual search task, target and distractor gratings differed
in orientation. Bottom-up salience was manipulated by adding
color as an additional stimulus dimension. Thus, the target stim-
ulus could be either a singleton in terms of color and orientation;
a singleton in terms of orientation only; or a singleton in terms
of orientation accompanied by a distractor singleton in terms of
color. Top-down control is described by Melloni et al. (2012) as
the influence of our inner goals on stimulus selection. This was
manipulated by presenting trials of different degrees of bottom-up
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 276 | 1
Rauss and Pourtois Bottom-up, top-down, and predictive coding
salience either in blocks or randomly intermixed. Results indicated
that primary visual cortex (V1) encodes only bottom-up salience,
V2 encodes only top-down control settings, and V4 encodes the
interaction between the two. The authors concluded that multiple
saliency maps are present at different levels of processing. Stimulus
selection could thus be flexibly adapted by referring to the saliency
map most relevant in the context of a given task (Weidner et al.,
2009).
In the three decades between the studies of Kinchla and Wolfe
(1979) and Melloni et al. (2012), conceptual and methodological
advances have substantially increased our knowledge of sensory
processing in general and of the visual system in particular. What
hasn’t changed during this time is our notion of bottom-up and
top-down processes. Staying with our first example, Kinchla and
Wolfe (1979) wrote:
[ . . .] the electrophysiological analysis of “receptive fields”
seemed to suggest a bottom-up mode of processing: Cells associ-
ated with progressively more complex fields [ . . .] were found as
one went from the retina to the visual cortex, as if systems for
detecting low-order “features” [ . . .] fed into systems for detect-
ing progressively more complex patterns. (Kinchla and Wolfe,
1979, p. 225)
[ . . .] it has been suggested that the order of visual processing
is best described as a top-down process, with higher-order forms
processed first, followed by lower-order forms [ . . .] (ibd.)
Compare this to a more recent definition is given by Palmer (1999):
“Bottom-up” processing [ . . .] refers to processes that take a
“lower-level” representation as input and create or modify a
“higher-level” representation as output. Top-down processing
[ . . .] refers to processes that operate in the opposite direction,
taking a “higher-level” representation as input and producing
or modifying a “lower-level” representation as output. (Palmer,
1999, pp. 84–85)
The common denominator of these and virtually all other defin-
itions of bottom-up and top-down processes can be summarized
as follows:
1. Information processing is organized hierarchically.
2. Lower levels of the hierarchy represent detailed stimulus
information, while higher levels represent more integrated
information.
3. Information exchange between levels is bidirectional.
The apparent simplicity of these assumptions may explain why the
terms bottom-up and top-down are used so frequently in research
on perception. However, these assumptions can be questioned,
and we briefly highlight some of the problems surrounding them.
A NOTE ON HIERARCHIES
Felleman and Van Essen (1991) advocated a distributed processing
hierarchy in the primate visual cortex based on anatomical con-
nectivity patterns. More recently, however, Hegdé and Felleman
(2007) noted that a hierarchically organized anatomical structure
does not imply that visual processing is itself hierarchical, nor that
the functional hierarchy (if it exists) matches the anatomical one
(Rousselet et al., 2004). Moreover, Hegdé and Felleman (2007)
state that the anatomical hierarchy itself is clear-cut only up to
the level of areas V4 and MT, with the sender-receiver distinc-
tion becoming less evident at higher levels. Thus, the notion of
hierarchical processing can be criticized on both structural and
functional grounds.
These criticisms may be partly resolved by adopting a more
flexible view of structural and functional hierarchies. An example
for such a view is provided by Engel et al. (2001), who distinguish
four “flavors” of top-down:
1. an anatomical one, equating top-down processes with func-
tional activity along descending connections between the levels
of the hierarchy
2. a cognitivist one, where top-down means hypothesis-driven
processing
3. a gestaltist one, viewing top-down processes in terms of
contextual modulations of bottom-up processing
4. a dynamicist one, describing top-down processes in terms of
an entrainment of local neuronal populations by widespread
oscillatory activity in distant and distributed brain regions.
The last of these flavors does not require a fixed anatomical or
functional hierarchy. It accommodates flexible recruitment of
brain regions for different tasks, without negating the known
specializations of these regions.
Indeed, the difficulties in establishing clear-cut processing hier-
archies in the central nervous system based on either anatomical
or functional criteria may be a direct consequence of the system’s
adaptability. Thus, rather than relying on a fixed hierarchy for
processing all types of stimuli and performing all sorts of tasks, it
seems likely that the system uses different hierarchies for different
tasks. This does not mean that the notion of processing hierar-
chies is obsolete, but that hierarchical processing should be seen
as a conceptual simplification.
Incidentally, the problems associated with hierarchical process-
ing models were already recognized by Kinchla and Wolfe (1979).
They stated that although individual images could usefully be
described in terms of a hierarchy of features, the knowledge under-
lying our perception of these images had neither top nor bottom.
Nevertheless, they argued that conceptualizing this knowledge as
hierarchically organized remains a useful simplification. Intrigu-
ingly, their discussion also points to the role of predictability in
establishing these hierarchies:
[ . . .] a major reason for such [a hypothetical hierarchical]
organization is the life-long sequential pattern of our visual
experience whereby recognition of a form at one level of struc-
ture is an almost invariant precursor of the recognition of forms
at levels slightly higher or lower. (Kinchla and Wolfe, 1979, p.
229)
PROBLEMS
Even if one accepts the basic assumptions underlying hierarchi-
cal processing models, there are a number of problems associated
with current notions of bottom-up and top-down processes. Some
examples from the literature will demonstrate that one author’s
top-down may well be another one’s bottom-up.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 276 | 2
Rauss and Pourtois Bottom-up, top-down, and predictive coding
A FUZZY DICHOTOMY
In a recent position paper, Theeuwes (2010a) reviewed evidence
for the notion that initial processing of a visual stimulus is exclu-
sively driven by bottom-up factors. The author focuses on selection
processes in visual search tasks and defines top-down selection as:
completely under control of the intentions of the observer
an active volitional process
based on expectancy and goal set (Theeuwes, 2010a, pp. 77–78)
Bottom-up selection, on the other hand, is described as:
determined by the feature properties present in the environment
passive [and] automatic
associated with salience
driven by emotional content or previous experience (ibd.)
Independent of whether or not one subscribes to Theeuwes’
(2010a) point of view, the number of concepts invoked to define
two commonly used terms suggests that there is actually more
to consider than a simple dichotomy. In other words, the use
of a simple binary classification does not appear to capture the
profusion of mental processes or functions described in these
statements, which include intention, volition, expectation, and
emotion. Accordingly, a large part of the discussion of Theeuwes’
(2010a) target paper concerns the delimitation of bottom-up and
top-down processes (Egeth et al., 2010; Folk and Remington, 2010;
Kristjánsson, 2010; Theeuwes, 2010b).
SEARCHING FOR THE TOP
Importantly, the problems with distinguishing bottom-up from
top-down processes are not limited to psychological studies. Con-
fusion also seems to reign at the apparently more solid level of
cellular neuroscience.
For example, Roland et al. (2006) used voltage-sensitive dye
(VSD) imaging in anesthetized ferrets. The authors found that
exposure to a luminance-defined square elicited forward and lat-
eral activation spread that was followed by a feedback wave of
activity traveling from extrastriate visual areas to V1. This feed-
back wave selectively highlighted first the stimulus representation
and then the representation of the background. Roland et al.
describe this feedback wave as a possible mechanism of top-down
influences on early visual cortex.
Kuhn et al. (2008), on the other hand, used depth-resolved
VSD imaging in mice during anesthesia and wakefulness. The
authors observed characteristic desynchronizations in layer 1 of
the somatosensory cortex upon awakening. They consider this
as evidence for long-range cortical and thalamic input exerting
top-down control over sensory processing during wakefulness.
Arguably, the term “top-down” is conceptually useless if it
describes neural activity during both wakefulness (Kuhn et al.,
2008) and anesthesia (Roland et al., 2006), with sources in either
closely neighboring regions (Roland et al., 2006) or anywhere in
the nervous system (Kuhn et al., 2008). However, such an interpre-
tation directly emerges from what Engel et al. (2001) termed the
anatomical flavor of top-down. That is, if activity along descending
fibers necessarily reflects top-down processes, the latter may orig-
inate from any source connected to the current region of interest,
provided that the source is located at a higher level of the hierar-
chy. And if source activity persists during sleep or anesthesia, this
would also qualify as top-down activity.
Barlow (1997) succinctly noted this problem, stating that the
visual system has no top. Reviewing potential sources of knowl-
edge used in visual processing, he argues that the interaction of
the genetically determined structure of the visual system and the
redundancies present in all visual images may explain many of the
effects usually attributed to top-down factors. He concludes:
To avoid the top-down/bottom-up dichotomy blinding us to
more important questions, the term “top-down” should per-
haps be challenged whenever it is used [ . . .] (Barlow, 1997, p.
1146)
Barlow’s (1997) understanding of top-down processes is that they
involve outside knowledge previously acquired through training
or teaching and brought to act upon current sensory input. Here,
“outside” refers to regions of the nervous system not primarily
concerned with visual processing.
While we fully agree with Barlow’s (1997) conclusion, it seems
what his argument essentially highlights is the vagueness of what is
meant by a top-down process. His critique rests on the assumption
that bottom-up processing consists of the interplay between the
system’s genetically predetermined structure and the organism’s
current environment. However, since the structure of the system
also defines how it stores and retrieves previously encoded infor-
mation, his understanding of bottom-up processes seems to leave
hardly any room for top-down processes.
BOTTOM-UP/TOP-DOWN VS. FEEDFORWARD/FEEDBACK
In summary, current notions of bottom-up and top-down
processes lump together largely disparate structures and func-
tions. As a consequence, it is often unclear whether there is a
difference between bottom-up and top-down processes on the
one hand and feedforward and feedback activity, on the other.
In this context, it is interesting to note that a number of authors
speak of “top-down feedback” to refer to attention-induced mod-
ulations of either stimulus-evoked activity (Martínez et al., 2001),
baseline activity (Kastner et al., 1999), or background connectivity
(Al-Aidroos et al., 2012). In most of these cases, the aim seems to
be to highlight the parallels between the psychological description
of higher cognitive processes and the anatomical description of
fibers connecting high-level to low-level regions. However, a more
literal interpretation would suggest that, if one has to specify that
a certain type of feedback is top-down, other types of feedback are
not. We will return to this idea in the following section.
PLASTICITY
In an original demonstration of how culture shapes perception,
Tse and Cavanagh (2000) showed that the direction of apparent-
motion perceived during the stepwise presentation of a Chinese
character differs between Chinese and American participants. The
character in question was unveiled one stroke at a time, without
actual movements contained in the stimulus. Based on Gestalt
principles (Wagemans et al., 2012a,b), the last stroke was expected
to be perceived as a right-to-left movement, and this is what
American subjects reported seeing. On the other hand, a major-
ity of Chinese subjects reported seeing a movement from left to
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right, in accordance with the movement performed when writ-
ing the character. The authors concluded that bottom-up cues for
motion perception can be overridden by top-down factors linked
to culturally shaped expectations.
In their discussion, Tse and Cavanagh (2000) note that:
The “standard” view of top-down processing is that later visual
areas influence earlier areas via feedback connections. There are
other possibilities, however. Expectation and knowledge could in
principle alter the circuitry involved in grouping, in which case
a top-down influence would be exerted in a bottom-up manner
(Tse and Cavanagh, 2000, p. B32)
This interpretation of top-down processes raises an important
issue: beyond the differences in how bottom-up and top-down
processes are conceptualized, individual differences may well lead
to situations where one participant’s bottom-up is another one’s
top-down.
SOLUTIONS
Given these ubiquitous problems, we believe it is time that the
concepts of bottom-up and top-down be refined based on current
evidence. We briefly highlight previous work aiming in this direc-
tion, before outlining a predictive-coding model that may help
resolve some of the issues outlined above.
TOP-DOWN 6= FEEDBACK
In an insightful commentary on Theeuwes (2010a), Rauschen-
berger (2010) argues that the dichotomy between bottom-up and
top-down processes should be abandoned altogether in light of
ever-increasing evidence on the importance of interactive infor-
mation processing in perception (Di Lollo et al., 2000). Rauschen-
berger (2010) goes on to propose that the directionality of neural
pathways does not necessarily correspond to their primary or
exclusive involvement in bottom-up or top-down processes.
The idea that ascending and descending pathways may be
jointly involved in both bottom-up and top-down processes seems
to us the single most important insight for salvaging these con-
cepts. Accordingly, this idea is at the core of our own proposals
below.
A THIRD ELEMENT
Following the lively discussion surrounding his position paper
(Theeuwes, 2010a), Theeuwes co-authored an article entitled
“Top-down vs. bottom-up attentional control: a failed theoretical
dichotomy” (Awh et al., 2012). The authors make the point that
attentional control cannot be fully described when only bottom-
up salience and top-down goals are taken into account. Rather,
selection history needs to be considered as well, i.e., whether a
particular stimulus was previously task-relevant or rewarded. Awh
et al. (2012) highlight how differences in selection history are often
confounded with top-down effects such as selective attention, and
how this may explain some of the contradictory findings in the
visual search literature (e.g., Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1996; Wolfe
et al., 2003).
The central and sometimes paradoxical role of selection his-
tory on attentional control is also in accordance with the idea that
active predictions of incoming information may affect sensory
processing at multiple levels. As Awh et al. put it:
[ . . .] we believe that [selection history effects] share one core
feature: in each case, past selection episodes are recapitulated
in subsequent trials when the relevant context is encountered
again. (Awh et al., 2012, p. 440)
Notwithstanding the importance of selection history effects, we
are unsure whether adding a third concept to the discussion is
helpful. Indeed, the definition given by Awh and co-workers is so
broad that it spans virtually all types of neural activity, as selection
history may be encoded at very different hierarchical levels (Treue,
2003) and on very different time-scales (Barlow, 1997).
A PREDICTIVE-CODING ACCOUNT
In the following, we outline a predictive-coding model from which
we derive simple and unequivocal definitions of bottom-up and
top-down processes. Our goal is not to provide detailed guidelines
for distinguishing these processes in complex biological systems.
Rather, we aim to re-establish top-down and bottom-up as useful
heuristic categories. In order to do so, we start from two simple
premises:
1. Bottom-up and top-down are not opposites.
2. Within hierarchical systems, both ascending and descend-
ing connections are involved in bottom-up and top-down
processes.
These premises are an extension of the main idea underlying
predictive-coding theories and more general accounts of brain
function (Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Friston, 2010): namely,
that bidirectional information exchange between the levels of hier-
archical systems serves to reconcile incoming information with
internally generated predictions. If this is the case, there are two
classes of questions one may ask about the system:
1. How is stimulus information compared to predictions?
2. Where do predictions come from, and where are prediction
errors routed to?
For the second class of questions, we believe the most interesting
functional unit is the loop formed by a central region that gen-
erates predictions and a lower-level region that receives stimulus
information and/or prediction-error signals from the periphery.
Now consider a biologically inspired, yet-to-be programed
computer model similar to previously published computational
accounts of the visual cortex (Rao and Ballard, 1999). The model
system is hierarchically organized over several levels, with increas-
ingly complex stimulus attributes represented at higher levels. For
the time being, we further assume that ascending and descending
connections only link neighboring areas within the hierarchy.
Combining these assumptions leaves us with a series of loops as
shown in Figure 1. We propose that these loops constitute the basis
of bottom-up processing. In other words, bottom-up processing
consists of one or more cycles of feedforward-feedback activity
along ascending and descending connections, instantiated across
pairs of neighboring areas in the hierarchy. This iterative, multi-
layered process reflects the current, semi-hardwired architecture of
the system, which in turn reflects a combination of phylogenetic
and ontogenetic information available to the organism.
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FIGURE 1 | Bottom-up processing as a series of loops formed by
ascending and descending connections between neighboring levels in
a hierarchically organized system. For simplicity, levels L1–L4 are shown
as consisting of three layers only (ascending input, descending input, and
output).
The crucial point here is that we explicitly assign a role
in bottom-up processing to descending connections between
neighboring areas in the hierarchy. Bottom-up processing along
this series of loops is reliable and relatively fast (Bullier, 2001;
Bacon-Mace et al., 2005). However, it is not very flexible.
It is now generally appreciated that even the earliest levels of
sensory processing remain malleable throughout life (Neville and
Bavelier, 2002; Bavelier et al., 2010). Animal studies have demon-
strated that intense training followed by appropriate consolidation
can lead to long-lasting modifications of neural responses in pri-
mary sensory cortices virtually from the first spike onward (Crist
et al., 2001; Li et al., 2004). Recent evidence from human studies
points in the same direction (Schwartz et al., 2002; Pourtois et al.,
2008; Bao et al., 2010).
This is what we refer to as a semi-hardwired architecture: one
that is sufficiently stable to allow for rapid processing of stimuli
that have been frequently encountered, either over the course of a
species’ evolution or during an individual’s lifespan; and that is at
the same time sufficiently flexible to adapt to lasting and pervasive
changes in the organism’s environment. However, neural plasticity
at the time-scales examined in the above-mentioned studies does
not offer enough flexibility to an organism in a competitive and
rapidly changing environment.
Thus, at a conceptual level, top-down processes can be con-
ceived of as influences that confer moment-to-moment flexibility
onto the semi-hardwired network that at any given time ensures
efficient and reliable sensory processing in known environments.
This relates to the assumption that the hierarchical organization
of sensory systems seen across modalities and species reflects two
basic imperatives in terms of predictive coding (Barlow, 1985):
first, to take in a maximum of new information in order to
detect contingencies in the environment; and second, to exploit
these contingencies, once extracted, to construct predictions about
the environment which can be rapidly applied to guide adaptive
behavior.
Contingencies and the predictions based upon them vary in
complexity, and there is rich evidence showing that low-level con-
tingencies may be reflected in the basic organization of low-level
sensory cortices (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Barlow, 2001), and even at
the level of the retina (Srinivasan et al., 1982; Barlow, 1997; Hosoya
et al., 2005). A particularly striking example is given by the seminal
work of Rao and Ballard (1999): the authors trained an artificial
neural network with natural images and explained end-stopping,
an extra-classical receptive field property of V1 neurons, in terms
of the frequent occurrence in their stimulus material of oriented
lines extending beyond the small receptive fields of the model’s V1
neurons.
High-level contingencies, on the other hand, relate to the
higher-order causes of what is currently perceived (Friston, 2005)
and can often only be detected by integrating information across
large portions of space, long intervals of time, and multiple modal-
ities (Clark, in press). As an example, consider natural languages:
understanding a spoken or written phrase in German can be com-
plicated by the fact that the verb may be positioned more flexibly
than for example in English. Thus, crucial aspects of the infor-
mation transmitted remain unspecified for different periods of
time, requiring different processes of verification, interpretation,
and prediction (Dambacher et al., 2009). Importantly, such dif-
ferences are completely independent of the actual content of the
message and also, to some extent, independent of sensory modal-
ity. These higher-order contingencies may be subject to more
rapid changes (e.g., switching between languages) than the reg-
ularities to which the lower levels of sensory systems are tuned
(Kersten et al., 2004), thus rendering adaptations based on long-
lasting structural reconfigurations or stimulus-specific functional
changes inappropriate.
We assume that the higher levels in our model system extract
such higher-order contingencies and dynamically use them to
create a set of relatively abstract predictions that can be rapidly
adapted or exchanged. However, for these abstract predictions to
be useful, there must be a way for them to effectively modulate
iterative bottom-up processing at many different levels of the hier-
archy. Therefore, we assume that top-down processes include some
form of bypassing or short-circuiting of bottom-up processes. The
fastest and most direct route to achieve this would be via direct
connections between high-level region L(z) and low-level region
L(x) which are not hierarchical neighbors and therefore do not
form a bottom-up processing loop.
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As a first approximation, we thus define top-down processes
as instances of direct information transfer from higher to lower
regions that skip at least one level in the hierarchy. This anatomical
criterion for distinguishing top-down from bottom-up processes
specifies the minimal requirements for the conceptual framework
outlined above. That is, in order to render bottom-up processing
more flexible, high-level regions are assumed to modulate activity
in low-level regions using information that is not represented at
intermediate levels.
This basic idea is depicted in Figure 2: a high-level region
relays information directly to a lower tier of the system, bypass-
ing an area situated more immediately upstream of this target
region. Given the reciprocity of most cortical connections (Felle-
man and Van Essen, 1991), we assume that top-down processes
also involve bidirectional information exchange, i.e., they rely on
loops of ascending and descending connections distinct from those
mediating bottom-up processing.
The main point here is that in our model, backward informa-
tion transfer between immediate neighbors in the hierarchy does
not qualify as top-down processing. This is important because
it separates our view of top-down processes from an apparently
simpler one based only on direction of information flow.
FIGURE 2 |Top-down effects as direct influences of a source region
located at least two levels above the target region in a hierarchical
predictive-coding system.
In summary, we propose an anatomical criterion for the sepa-
ration of functional activity patterns into categories of bottom-up
and top-down. Given a strictly hierarchical system, this criterion
specifies the minimal requirements for classifying a particular pat-
tern of effective connectivity as top-down: namely, there must be a
direct anatomical connection between a source and a target region,
and the source must be located at least two levels above the target.
TESTING THE PREDICTIVE-CODING ACCOUNT
It is important to note that our proposals are not meant to be
a comprehensive theory of hierarchical processing. Rather, we
provide axiomatic definitions of two equivocal terms commonly
invoked to build theories and to interpret empirical results. Our
ideas should be critically discussed and empirically tested. Ideally,
these tests would demonstrate two things:
1. Our proposals provide a better heuristic for interpreting previ-
ous empirical results than current loose notions of bottom-up
and top-down processes.
2. Our proposals provide novel hypotheses and correctly predict
the outcome of future experiments.
Explaining previous results
An important limitation of current descriptions of bottom-up and
top-down processes is that they largely fail to explain fundamental
effects on perceptual processing, such as priming (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006). This limitation clearly emerges in the discussion of
the position paper by Theeuwes (2010a) already mentioned. A
large part of this discussion focuses on whether priming should be
conceived of as a bottom-up (Theeuwes, 2010a,b) or a top-down
process (de Fockert, 2010; Egeth et al., 2010; Eimer and Kiss, 2010;
Kristjánsson, 2010; Müller et al., 2010).
On the one hand, priming can be seen as a very basic process
that one is tempted to classify as purely bottom-up: it is rapid
(Dehaene et al., 2001), often automatic in the sense of being unre-
lated to the observer’s goals (Moors and De Houwer, 2006), and it
can apply to very basic stimulus characteristics coded at the low-
est levels of sensory processing (Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1994,
1996). On the other hand, an increasing body of evidence shows
that priming effects can be object-related (Chun and Jiang, 1998;
Kristjansson et al., 2008) as well as linked to the observer’s goals
(Kiefer and Martens, 2010). More importantly, it is difficult to
describe priming as purely stimulus-driven, as it reflects an effect
of previous stimulation, and hence some kind of memory trace
has to be involved (Kristjánsson, 2010).
We believe our proposals could prove valuable in resolving this
debate. They suggest that priming can be instantiated both along
the loops of ascending and descending connections between hier-
archical neighbors that we have described as the anatomical basis
of bottom-up processing, and via top-down processes that operate
along long-range cortico-cortical connections (Summerfield et al.,
2006). In this view, priming effects are not seen as a monolithic
phenomenon reflecting a unitary process (for a similar arguments,
see Henson, 2003; Kristjánsson and Campana, 2010). Rather, dif-
ferent forms of priming may arise depending on the processes and
pathways recruited to yield this sensory facilitation. More specif-
ically, discrepancies in the literature concerning the influence of
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goals, task set, etc., on priming could be linked to the involvement
(or not) of high-level control regions that represent task-relevant
contingencies.
Deriving novel hypotheses
Our proposals rest on the assumption that top-down processes
confer flexibility onto the semi-hardwired network underlying
bottom-up processes by short-circuiting the latter. One way to
test this central assumption is to show that in the absence of top-
down input, bottom-up processing is either substantially delayed
or fails entirely (Super et al., 2001). As an example for testing this
idea, consider a study by Muckli et al. (2005), who showed that the
perception of apparent-motion leads to BOLD activity in V1 along
the apparent-motion trajectory. The authors concluded that the
most likely source for this effect was feedback from area MT to V1.
Given that MT is located several levels above V1 in the visual
hierarchy (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991), an unequivocal demon-
stration that the efficient detection of the (illusory) motion stim-
ulus depends on top-down processes short-circuiting bottom-up
processes would require selectively deactivating the connections
between V1 and MT in both directions. This should preserve pro-
cessing along the hierarchy of bottom-up loops up to and beyond
MT. Our model suggests that in this case, the perception of illu-
sory motion should be absent, or at least substantially delayed and
reduced.
While this experiment may be difficult to carry out with cur-
rent methods, more realistic approaches exist. For example, in an
extension of previous work (Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001) using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), one could temporarily
deactivate MT, which should not only reduce the perception of
apparent motion, but also the concomitant activity along the
apparent-motion trajectory in V1. Such an approach cannot iso-
late the specific contributions of direct connections between MT
and V1. However, if similar effects can be obtained for other types
of illusions, involving high-level visual areas other than MT, this
would offer converging evidence for our view.
CONCLUSION
Based on a predictive-coding model, we have outlined a concep-
tually unequivocal distinction between bottom-up and top-down
processes that addresses some of the limitations of our current
understanding of these terms. Our proposals highlight the mutual
interdependence and constant interaction between bottom-up and
top-down processes. Thus, rather than searching for cases of pure
bottom-up or top-down processing, future efforts should address
their relative contributions as well as the mechanisms of their
interaction in the context of a given task.
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